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What does it mean to be visible? We cross paths and we see each 
other. Simple. Why bother asking the question? The fact that artists and 
cultural theorists have for the past decade or more been energetically 
pursuing precisely this question of visibility is one of the dominant 
features of the visual arts today. At the heart of this collective inquiry is 
a concern to discover the social nature of both vision and pictures. This 
concern rises out of the almost common-sense realization that much of 
what we “know” about the world we know because of pictures and that 
despite much rhetoric to the contrary, we generally believe that what 
we see is true. Or at least we act that way. We are transported through 
pictures to believe the stories that they tell.
Vision (the stimulation of optic sense organs) is not the same thing 
as perception which includes the mental ordering and ultimately the 
attribution of significance to visual sensation. The art historian, Jonathan 
Crary (1992) traces changes in both the art and science of the early 19th 
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century that reflect a shift from the idea that visual perception is like a 
camera obscura (direct and true) to the idea that vision and perception 
are constructs of both the observer’s mind and the social conditions 
surrounding a visual experience. The stereo camera and its illusion of 
3-dimensionality is offered as a symptom of this new understanding 
of visual perception. Crary expands on the constructed nature of 
visual perception by exploring the separation of vision from the other 
senses and, ultimately, from the need for a connection between visual 
perception and the “real” objects reproduced in a picture (pp. 67-96). 
Essentially Crary argues that developing lens technologies and early 
work by researchers such as Müller and Fechner into the physiology of 
perception lay important groundwork for the behaviorist assumptions 
of both the mass-media and early psychology (pp. 137-150). 
Two important ideas  serve as foundational components of 
postmodernity. First, vision “works” even when the viewer is separated 
from direct physical contact with a seen object. The second idea is 
that, at least to some extent, visual sensations can be measured and 
managed. The entire film industry and its elaborate visual apparatus is 
one manifestation of this. The capacity of lens images to be erotic is clear 
evidence of their ‘spectacular’ impact. Since images are mass-produced, 
visibility, and its opposite, invisibility, become social conditions. Media 
specialists use lens technologies to represent a world that is capable of 
serving the ends of those who control the production and distribution 
of those images. 
As Benjamin (1985) pointed out, photography is potent both 
because of the kind of image it can produce and because those images 
can be reproduced. Mass-media imagery represents the bulk of 
information about the world for many people. Therefore, those people 
whose lifestyles are somehow undesirable, are not represented in the 
mass-media, and are in a very significant way, invisible. This results 
from the “postmodern” dependence on simulacrum to anchor “reality.” 
Pamela Anderson and Ellen DeGeneris come to signify different aspects 
of female, Johnny Depp and Wesley Snipes becomes signifiers of what 
it means to be male, as our own experiences of gender (or race, or age, 
or culture) become increasingly irrelevant.
Symptoms
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Martin Heidegger once called this “The Age of the World 
Picture.” To him “the fact that the world becomes a picture 
at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modern age.” 
Nothing in the world, he contended, exists any longer except 
in and through representation. (Jussim, 1989, p. 10) 
More recently, Victor Burgin describes “a picture of a new subject 
for the new society of information technology—a subject (like the subject 
known to psycho-analysis) radically ‘decentered,’ [a subject formed] in 
the wake of the signifier” (Burgin, 1986, p. 168). The signifiers Burgin 
mentions are the traces of bio/graphic and economic data scattered 
throughout institutional computer banks which, when they are gathered 
together, represent the “decentered”1  individual’s existence in society 
more powerfully than does her or his body.
In the essay Through the Narrative Portal (Kozloff, 1987), critic Max 
Kozloff explores the dynamics of simulacral2  experience by looking at 
a black and white ad typical of those pioneered by Bruce Weber for 
Calvin Klein designer jeans and cotton underwear. 
The scene illustrates a possible sexual contretemps that has 
been calculated to appeal to both genders. Asking us to 
speculate on the fascinating pass to which the couple has 
been brought, the image switches its narrative lure to an 
object display that conveys, in fact, the real story message. 
Ours not so much to wonder about the history of this tense, 
mysterious pair, as to acknowledge that wearers of Calvins 
1The Freudian concept of being ‘decentered’ is used here to describe not 
only a psychological but also a social condition resulting from the individual’s 
experience of self and other through the many apparatus of mass-representation. 
In various texts Barbara Maria Stafford (1993, 1994, 1996)  traces the beginnings 
of the technology of decentering and visuality to Enlightenment efforts to stabi-
lize knowledge. See also Harlan (1995, pp. 114-124) for an extended discussion 
of the media representation of first nations’ women and contemporary artists’ 
strategies of re-presentation.
2Burgin’s use of “simulacrum” represents a fairly extreme understanding of 
a slippery term. Simulacrum can mean anything from simply a representational 
image to something akin to and as dangerous as a mirage. (See also Krauss, 
1980.) In choosing to use this term I am consciously introducing a sliding scale 
of potential meanings which, in the context of visuality I have termed “Lens 
Meaning”(Emme, 1989).
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are likely to have such a history. Suitably denimed, we, too 
. . . can embark on the sensual and other adventures of the 
role reversal. (Kozloff, 1987, p. 93)
The advertising industry has taken the psychoanalytic notion 
of identification to heart and is providing imagery like that described 
by Kozloff for both the consumer’s conscious and unconscious mind. 
Because the mass-media are subsidized by business institutions that 
expect sales to result from their support, it is not surprising that 
“desirable” lifestyles dominate mass-media imagery. Because the styles 
of life represented in the media’s lens imagery exist only as simulacra, 
the viewing subject is brought to desire some “thing” that for all practical 
purposes doesn’t exist. Even if the viewer of a media-generated lifestyle 
image could buy all the objects and re-enact the uses represented in the 
image, that viewer could not reproduce the hermetic seal of photographic 
idealization. Burgin (1986) claims “in a (Platonic) word, upon which 
Jean Baudrillard has elaborated, we are a society of the simulacrum” 
(p. 169). Our place in society and our notions of what is real are defined 
in large part by databases and mass-media imagery.
In describing the lens as a prosthetic device, Rosalind Krauss (1985) 
draws attention to a key complication to the concept of visibility. Our 
technologies allow us to see around the world, to see both the macro 
and the micro, and to see both slowly and quickly.  These views of the 
world transcend our original sensual capacities. To the extent that we 
have come to depend on these same technologies to bring us a “complete 
experience of the world,” they serve to define the visible. Existence has 
become a product of the mass-media. Our visual perceptions seem to 
provide us with an ever expanding opportunity to know the world, 
but this postmodern vision relies less and less on direct physical 
experience of people or actual objects. Much of our world is ink on 
paper or illuminated screens.
The many technological and social apparatuses that order vision 
in postmodern society (Eleftheriotis, 1995), as dominant modes of 
representation,  are more central to our visibility than are an individual’s 
own work or visual literacy. To be fully engaged in our visibility as 
individuals and as participants in our own culture(s), we must engage 
with the business of representation. If we are not picture makers, or 
at least vigorous critics of pictures, then we are passive viewers of a 
culture that others define.
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Strategies
The discussion among photographers concerming the relative 
merits of straight (realist) and pictorialist (expressive) photography 
established a polarity that contemporary critics question. These (perhaps 
false) polarities of objective and subjective meaning are contained within 
a larger cultural context, with the result that 
the study of “visual art”—for so long confined within 
artificially narrow intellectual and institutional limits—
now ranges across the broader spectrum of what [Victor 
Burgin has] called the “integrated specular regime” of our 
“mass-media” society. “Art theory,” understood as those 
interdependent forms of art history, aesthetics, and criticism, 
which began in the Enlightenment and culminated in the 
recent period of “high modernism,” is now at an end. In our 
present so-called “postmodern” era the end of art theory now 
is identical with the objectives of theories of representations 
in general: a critical understanding of the modes and means 
of symbolic articulation of our critical forms of sociality and 
subjectivity must be contextualized. (Burgin, 1986, p. 204)
In many ways, traditional critical and economic practices still 
dominate the artworld. But photography, as a popular art, is not as 
restricted by these fine art institutions. “Photography is too multiple, 
too useful to other discourses, ever to be wholly contained within 
the traditional definitions of art. Photography will always exceed the 
institution of art, always participate in non-art practices, always threaten 
the insularity of art discourse” (Underhill, 1989, p. 25). 
One result of [this] situation is that photography has been more 
readily accepted as a starting point for an interdisciplinary 
study that, following the logic of its methods, is [potentially] 
able to move out into a radical dismantling of social relations 
without having to bring these discoveries back as nothing 
more than meanings for the hallowed [artworld] series. 
(Rifkin, 1988, pp. 162-163)
Lopes (1996) uses the term “demotic pictures” to refer to mundane, 
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as opposed to art, images (p. 6).  “Pictures share language’s burden in 
representing the world and our thoughts about it. And this function of 
pictures is at the forefront in the demotic rather than the aesthetic”(Lopes, 
1996, p. 7). Within this context of photography as a radically accessible and 
popular practice on the one hand, and a convention-bound institutional 
practice on the other, I would like to give further examples of work that 
attempts to reclaim visibility.  
Jo Spence (Dennett & Spence, 1982) and Judith Golden (Grundberg 
& Gauss, 1987) are among those who have used photography to 
explore the invisibility of being old, plain, female, and sick. Golden’s 
imagery includes somewhat comical self-portraits where parts of her 
face peer through holes torn in the faces of media celebrities depicted 
on the cover of People magazine (Grundberg & Gauss, 1987). Spence 
practices a personal form of phototherapy through explicit documentary 
photographs of the fleshy impact of her own and her mother’s surgery 
(Hoy, 1987). She and a male friend and collaborator presented childhood 
fantasies about their fathers in family photo album form (Spence, 1987, 
pp. 24-5). Spence produced an autobiographical text and guidebook 
designed to document her explorations and to suggest how others 
might do the same (Spence, 1986). Spence’s images are “theoretical” 
(McGrath, 1987, p. 71), in the same sense that Burgin (1986) used the 
term with reference to painting.
An expansion of the concept of “conceptual,” as it was used to 
describe that art in the 70s that de-emphasized individual objects in 
favor of ideas played out through social interaction and technological 
mechanism, can help us to understand a viewer’s emotional response 
to photographs at a symbolic level. Spence’s work is to be taken as Art, 
but these images of the “unspeakable and invisible” are not only offered 
as challenging aesthetic objects in the traditional sense (Spence, 1986, p. 
71). Spence “suggests that the task at hand for any radical photographic 
practice is both to unpick the apparently seamless photographic web and 
simultaneously to weave new meanings” (1986, p. 71). There is a pointed 
irony in Spence’s work being collected in the form of a photographic 
how-to manual for the invisible. The text acts as a powerful antidote to 
the multitude of soft-porn photographic manuals on the market, such as 
How to Photograph Women—Beautifully (O’Rourke, 1986), with its amply 
illustrated selection of poses, costumes, lighting, and make-up tips. It 
functions as a visual dictionary for creating photographic simulacra. 
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The historical oppositions of objective and subjective in 
photography are complicated and made more relevant by Abigail 
Solomon-Godeau’s concern with the politics of representation. In her 
concluding essay for Reframings: New American Feminist Photographies 
(Neumaier, 1995), Solomon-Godeau introduces a third dimension to 
representation which she calls “subaltern postmodernism” (Solomon-
Godeau, p.304). She describes the projects of photographic artists such 
as Renee Green, Carrie Mae Weems, Lorna Simpson, or Cindy Sherman, 
each of whom incorporate aspects of seemingly realist photographic 
portraiture-of-self in their work. Solomon-Godeau tentatively argues 
that subaltern postmodernist artists “deploy a form of self-representation 
that exceeds the personal, [and] can even be considered impersonal”(p. 
304). These images challenge existing mass-mediated representations. 
She suggests that:
If indeed the project of representing women remains an 
important project for feminism, it must be with the awareness 
that the women who represent, and the subject of their 
representations, must navigate on the one hand the legacy of 
bourgeois individualism that exalts the individual producer, 
and on the other, the risk of a totalizing or universalizing 
assumption that the category “woman” is equivalent to 
the plurality of difference that constitutes the category 
“women.” (p. 310)
The technical and economic accessibility of photography explains, 
in part, the medium’s popularity as an avenue for oppositional cultural 
practice. It is still true, however, that we tend only to see the work 
of those (young, feminist, gay, or lesbian) among the invisible who 
have gained access to the artworld. One of the great fallacies that has 
grown out of the age of mechanical reproduction is that the value or 
import of an image somehow inevitably corresponds to the size of its 
viewing audience. This assumes that the mass production of images, 
with the distance this puts between an original image (if it exists) and 
the viewing audience, unavoidably frees that audience from a kind 
of “false consciousness” implicit in the extreme value placed on the 
uniqueness of the original art object. Walter Benjamin suggested in 
1935 that mechanically reproduced art, “instead of being based on 
ritual, begins to be based on another practice—politics” (Benjamin, 
1985, p. 681). This capacity of photography to move the viewer to some 
form of internal or external “action” depends on its marketability in a 
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fickled artworld. When Marcel Duchamp complained that “I threw the 
bottle-rack and the urinal into their faces as a challenge and now they 
admire them for their aesthetic beauty” (Richter, 1966, pp. 207-208), 
he pinpointed the artworld’s capacity to undermine opposition by co-
opting it into the institutional fold. The “business” of symbol making 
is a precarious one that involves mounting effective social criticism 
within an institutional artworld that will either deny you access to an 
audience or market you as an “Artist.” Economist and former Canada 
Council Director of Research Harry Hillman-Chartrand has suggested 
that the artworld today is, in effect, the research and development arm 
of the advertising industry (Hillman-Chartrand, 1989). Richard Bolton’s 
article, Enlightened Self Interest: The Avant-Garde in the ’80s (Bolton, 1989, 
pp. 12-18) with its images of feminist photo-artists Cindy Sherman and 
Barbara Kruger as cover-girls for ARTnews and any number of ads 
depicting the desirability of the artworld lifestyle, is explicit evidence of 
Hillman-Chartrand’s claim. Clearly the issue is more complex than this. 
The use of lens media to produce representations from within specific 
cultures does not require mass distribution or artworld recognition. 
However, any advertiser will tell you that you have to get your message 
out, somehow.
Cultures in Contention (Kahn & Neumaier, 1985) is a good example 
of a selection of cultural works (some using photography and other lens 
media) which generally side-step the artworld in favor of representing 
people and issues that have otherwise been absent from the mainstream 
media. Much of this work has used the formal presentation and context 
of advertising or journalistic photography to inject oppositional imagery 
into the mass-media. In the SuperBowl bus ad project (Sisco, 1987), three 
artists produced photographic poster ads for display on the outside of San 
Diego city buses. The images drew attention to San Diego’s dependence 
on an impoverished workforce of illegal aliens during the time that the 
city hosted the SuperBowl and was especially sensitive about its image. 
Fred Lonidier’s work with unions involved producing documentary 
photographs combined with written text that were presented to the 
union workers as a kind of mirror (Lonidier, 1985). The work of Hans 
Haacke has used the billboard for explicitly political purposes in an 
artworld context (Haacke, 1985). The Guerrilla Girls have used the full 
vocabulary of the advertising industry (including, but not limited to 
photography) to take issues of injustice both within and beyond the 
artworld “to the streets” (G. Girls, 1995).
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Organizations have explored alternative venues for their art work 
like Group Material which have produced a black and white newspaper 
insert that contained imagery ranging from the traditionally artistic to 
the overtly political (Group Materials, 1988). These efforts comprise a 
kind of counter-acculturation that attempts to encourage viewers outside 
of the artworld to question appearances. They also promote change.
Concerning the imaged world of children, the bulk of images, 
whether they are framed as advertising, education, entertainment or 
art, (Corkin, 1990) are the product of an adult vision of childhood. It 
is reasonable to argue that children are completely invisible in our 
society because none of the images we see of them are self-produced. 
Fortunately, there are examples of organizations or individuals trying 
to give, whether for altruistic or commercial reasons, the apparatus 
of representation to children. Visible programs, such as Shooting Back 
(Hubbard, 1991, 1994), allow homeless children to document their 
experiences. Commercially, The Polaroid Education Project has moved 
from its origins in grants to individual innovative teachers/artists such 
as Wendy Ewald (1985) and her work with Appalachian children, to a 
national network that clearly mixes kid-based photogaphy, with more 
mainstream educational strategies. But if textbooks, teaching resources, 
and the mass-media in general are an appropriate indicator, children 
are virtually invisible in our society.  
Certainly at some level the goal of self-representation is a 
foundational assumption of most art education, but the transition from 
image consumer to critically grounded, effective image producer will 
require much work. Students need to become visually fluent in the 
forms of the mass-media and to develop an awareness of the connection 
between the social and the personal that is embedded in every media 
image. Art educators must  make the transition, as Lopes (1996) has done, 
from unquestioning acceptance of cannonical images to a recognition 
of the importance of “demotic” or everyday images (p. 5).  John Berger 
(1974) described the importance of photography. 
We think of photographs as works of art, as evidence of 
a particular truth, as likenesses, as news items. Every 
photograph is in fact a means of testing, confirming and 
constructing a total view of reality. Hence the crucial role of 
photography in ideological struggle. Hence the necessity of 
our understanding a weapon which we can use and which 
can be used against us. (Berger, 1974, p. 294)
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The Lens Media’s potential for allowing popular input into 
cultural production, as well as its key role in the mass production of 
commercial imagery, makes understanding the many uses of the lens 
media of central importance to the individual’s critical participation 
in contemporary society.
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